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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
THOMAS CHESTER PERRY, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 
12611 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The defendant, Thomas Chester Perry, was con-
victed by a jury in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah of the crime of robbery in viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-51-1 (1953). The Honor-
able Joseph E. Nelson, Judge, presided. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On January 14, 1970, a jury found defendant 
guilty of the crime of robbery. Defendant was sen-
tenced to a term of five years to life. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks affirmance of defendant's • 
conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Hereinafter the transcript of the preliminary hear· 
1 
ing is referred to as "P.", the transcript of the trial ii 
referred to as "T.", and the Record on Appeal is re· 
f erred to as "R." 
On the evening of December 12, 1968, defendant 1 
and a companion forced themselves into the residence 
of David Harness in Orem, Utah, at gunpoint. While 
his companion held Mrs. Harness at gunpoint, de· 
fondant forced l\Ir. Harness to drive him to the Allen's 
Super Save Market in Orem, Utah, which Mr. Harness 
managed. While at the store defendant, in the presence 
1 
and close proximity of four other witnesses and under 
good lighting conditions, forced Mr. Harness to remore ' 
the contents of the Store's safe and place such in de· ' 
fendant's possession. During the course of the robbery i 
both defendant and his companions not only were 
armed, but also carried walkie talkies. Mr. and Mrs. 
Harness and the other witnesses were told that if de· 
fendant was interf erred with during the course of the 
robbery, defendant's companion would be notified by 
walkie talkie to kill Mrs. Harness and the two Harness 
children. After defendant obtained the contents of the 
safe he forced Mr. Harness to drive him back to the 
3 
Harness residence, where defendant and his compan-
ion tied and gagged Mr. and Mrs. Harness and fled. 
\\
1 itnesses testifying to these events are as fol-
lows: David Harness (P. 13-42; T. 23-40); Darlene 
Harness (P. 42-63; T. 40-53); Clark Naylor (P. 63-
76; T. 67-74); Floyd Hallsey (P. 76-90; T. 53-62); 
Ruth Hallsey (P. 90-98; T. 62-67); and Dean Olsen 
(T. 74-77). 
Prior to the p r e 1 i m i n a r y hearing five of 
these witnesses were shown approximately twenty-
seven pictures from which each of the five witnesses 
positively identified the defendant as the person who 
committed the robbery (P. 25-26, 52-55, 73-74, 108; T. 
9). The photographs were not displayed in any partic-
ular order (P. 102); no single picture recurred and no 
photograph was in any manner emphasized (P. 25, 52-
54, 73, 89, 96, 102; T. 8, 19). No communication was 
made to the witnesses by the officer conducting the 
photographic identification before the witnesses had 
completed making their identifications. Each identifi-
cation was conducted in the absence of the other wit-
nesses. 
A preliminary hearing was held on January 5, 
1970, before the Honorable H. V. Wentz in City Court 
of Orem, Utah. Defendant, then serving a sentence at 
San Quentin Prison in California, was brought to Utah 
and was present with counsel at that hearing. In the 
course of the hearing each of five witnesses positively 
4 
identified the defendant as the man they had seen in: 
connection with the robbery of Allen's Super Save , 
Market. 
Defendant was bound over to stand trial before the 
Honorable .Joseph E. Nelson of the Fourth J udici~ ' 
District on a charge of committing the crime of rob· , 
bery. Defendant entered a motion to suppress the testi· 
mony of the witnesses who testified at the preliminary 
hearing ( R. 16; T. 7) , and a motion to dismiss the in· 
1 
formation for variance (T. 20, 78), both of which were 
I 
denied by the court. Defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict was also denied ( T. 79). The jury entered a 
verdict of guilty (R. 42) and the defendant was sen· 
tenced to a term of five years to life to be served in 
the Utah State Prison (R. 51). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE IDENTIFICATION OF DEFEND· ! 
ANT AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING' 
WAS CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE V\TITH 
LAW AND WAS NOT UNNECESSARILY 
C 0 N D U C I V E TO IRREPARABLE .MIS· 
TAKEN IDENTITY. 
The standard for determining the illegality of an 
identification elicited during a pretrial confrontation is 
5 
that set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 
S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d ll99 ( 1967). In that case the 
Court said that such an identification will constitute a 
ground for reversal of conviction where, depending 
upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
confrontation, the confrontation " ... was so unneces-
sarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken 
identification that [defendant] was denied due pro-
cess of law." Stovall, supra at 302. 
The preliminary hearing confrontation in the in-
stant case was not so suggestive as to violate that 
standard. From the preliminary hearing testimony of 
the five identifying witnesses it is clear that each wit-
ness identified the defendant at the preliminary hear-
ing prior to notice of and apart from any possible sug-
gestive circumstances surrounding defendant's appear-
ance at that hearing. Four identifying witnesses testi-
fied to the effect that their attention was so highly 
focused upon the defendant's physical features when 
he appeared initially at the hearing as to exclude 
from their awareness any observation or sensation 
which might have been prompted by the allegedly sug-
gestive circumstances surrounding the introduction of 
the defendant into the courtroom. 
These witnesses testified explicitly that no obser-
\'ation of the handcuffs worn by the defendant was 
made by them until after a positive identification had 
6 
already been made in the mind of each (T. 12, 14-15, 
52, 65, 73). 
The detail, certainty and consistency of the testi· 
mony adduced at the hearing from the identifying wit-
nesses, both in identifying the defendant and in relat-
ing the elements of the robbery, supply further evi-
dence that the alleged suggestiveness of the circum-
stances at the hearing did not influence the identifica-
tion. Each witness testified in the absence of the other 1 
witnesses; yet there was no conflict in their testimony. 
Not one of the witnesses at the preliminary hearing ex-
perienced any difficulty in identifying the defendant. 
Their identification was confident and unequivocal and 
did not depend in any degree upon the allegedly sng· 
gestive circumstances of the identification procedure. 
Inasmuch as the defendant was represented by 
counsel at the preliminary hearing, defendant's quota-
tion from United States v. TYade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 , 
S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1027 ( 1967), at page 12 of his 
brief is inapposite. The language quoted from that 
opinion refers to the dangers which may result when a ' 
pre-trial lineup is conducted in the absence of defense 
counsel. 
For these reasons under the totality of the circum· 
stances the identification which took place during the 
preliminary hearing was not so suggestive that it tainted 
~!'c in-court identification at trial. 
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POINT II 
THE IDENTIFICATION OF DEFEND-
AXT AT TRIAL \VAS ARRIVED AT BY AP-
PROPRIATE AND LAWFUL MEANS FROM 
SOURCES INDEPENDENT OF AND DIS-
TINGUISHABLE FROl\I THE IDENTIFICA-
TION OF DEFENDANT AT THE PRELIM-
IX ARY HEARING AND THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MO-
TION TO SUPPRESS THE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING TESTIMONY OF THE IDENTI-
FYING \VITNESSES AND DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
The United States Supreme Court has established 
the rule that where a pre-trial identification by the 
same eyewitness who offers identification testimony at 
trial is violative of due process, the trial identification 
may still be admissible if it has an independent source. 
This rule was enunciated in Wong Swn v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 
( 1963) as follows: 
" [ T] he more apt question ... is 'whether, 
granting establishment of the primary illegality 
the evidence to which instant objection is made 
has been come at by exploitation of that il-
legality or instead by means sufficiently dis-
8 
tinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' 
McGuire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)." 
See also United States v. Wade, supra at 241; Gil· 
bert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73, 87 S.Ct. 19.51, 
18 L.Ed.2d 1178 ( 1967) ; Clemons v. United States, 
408 F.2d 1230, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1968); State v. Vas-
quez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 279, 451 P.2d 786, 787 ( 1969). 
The United States Supreme Court has also estab· 
lished the related rule that a federal constitutional error 
can be held harmless if a court is able to declare it harm· 
less beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 70;i 
( 1967). See also Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 
S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963). 
Plaintiff maintains that, even assuming the estab· 
lishment of the illegality of the preliminary hearing 
1 
identification, either the observation of the defendant , 
by the identifying witnesses at the time of the robbery, 
or the later photographic identification of the def end· 
ant by the same witnesses, is an independent source of 
identification sufficient to purge the trial identifica· 
tion of any taint caused by such prior identification. 
Taken together these sources not only constitute ab· 
solutely and unquestionably an independent source, but 
also render the alleged illegality of the preliminary 
hearing ha1mless error. 
A 
The testimony of the identifying witnesses at the 
trial was not the direct result of the identification which 
took place at the preliminary hearing and was not come 
at by the exploitation of any illegality which might have 
Leen associated with that identification. The identifica-
tion at trial had an independent and primary source in 
the observations made by the identifying witnesses at 
the time the robbery was committed. 
Each witness viewed the defendant for a consid-
erable period of time under favorable conditions dur-
ing the commission of the robbery. Mr. Harness, the 
first identifying witness to testify at trial, observed the 
<lefendant at close range for approximately one and a 
half hours; that is, from the time the defendant forced 
his way into the Harness residence at gunpoint (T. 25), 
at between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m. (T. 42), until approxi-
mately 10 :50 ( T. 46), when the defendant fled from 
the Harness residence following the robbery. Mr. Har-
ness recounted in detail conversation had with the de-
fendant and the actions and physical characteristics of 
the defendant (T. 25-37). Mr. Harness observed the 
defendant for at least one-half hour in the Harness 
residence ( T. 42, 46) , presumably in ample light; for 
several minutes while sitting on the same seat as the 
defendant during the ride to and from the robbery site 
in 1\Ir. Harness's automobile, for approximatelly 30 
10 
minutes under adequate light ( T. 71) while at the rob-
bery site; and again at the Harness home for sewrai 
minutes upon returning from the place of the crime. 
In addition, both )fr. and l\Irs. Harness must have 
been prompted by a feeling of immense urgency to 
focus their attention and powers of observation upon I 
the defendant, for it was their family and their lirn 
which were most threatened and in very real danger. 
They had great reason to establish in their minds a per-
fect picture of the man who so threatened them. They 1 
<lid establish such a picture. The urgent circumstances 
ensured the veraciousness and accuracy of that picture. 
Mrs. Harness also testified in impressive detail at 
the trial concerning the iclentity of the robber based 
upon her observation at the time of the robbery (T. 41-
47). At trial, l\lrs. Harness identified the defendant 
without any doubt as the person who held her and her 
husband at gunpoint at their home ( T. 42), left with 
her husband for the grocery store (T. 46), later re· 
turned with her husband and bound and gagged her an<l 
her husband at their home before fleeing ( T. 47). Al-
to(J'ether lVTrs. Harness observed the defendant for 30· 
b ' 
4_,5 minutes under the optimum conditions of her lighted 
home. In testimony consistent with that of the other wit-
nesses, she described in forrnidible detail defendant's 
attributes, actions and conversation at the time of the 
robbery. 
11 
.Jlr. Hallsey offered further testimony substan-
tiating the identification of the defendant as the per-
petrator of the robbery (T. 53-57). He observed the 
defendant at the scene of the robbery for approximate-
ly one-half hour. l\Ir. Hallsey carefully studied the de-
fendant while the robbery was in progress (T. 55). His 
testimony corroborated that given by the other identify-
ing witnesses, although he was examined at trial in their 
absence . 
. Hrs. Hallsey offered identifying testimony based 
upon her eyewitness observation of the robbery. Short-
ly after defendant and l\Ir. Harness arrived at the 
scene of the robbery Mrs. Hallsey was asked to join 
them. Upon being made aware of what was transpir-
ing, she spoke to the defendant face to face in an effort 
to dissuade him from continuing further ( T. 64) . 
Finally, Mr. Naylor, who served in the Air Force 
as an agent in the Office of Special Investigations, also 
testified conclusively concerning the identity of the de-
fendant as the robber (T. 67-70). l\1r. Naylor observed 
the defendant for approximately IO minutes as the rob-
bery was in progress and came within three or four feet 
of the defendant (T. 71). At the preliminary hearing 
l\fr. Naylor testified that he carefully analyzed de-
fendant's appearance during the robbery, stating at page 
G9 of the preliminary hearing transcript: 
" ... [A]ll I could do is get a fix on 
the man, and so I stood there staring at him 
12 
trying not to be too obvious, but staring at 
him for the length of time that it took for the 
safe to be emptied and the instructions to go 
on. And I would say this was at least eight 
minutes or so, and so I was staring at this man 
here trying to get a fix on how tall he was, how 
m•.Ich he weighed, and so on and so on and so 
on, what he looked like, what distinguishing 
characteristics I could pick up and so on." 
Plaintiff urges that the testimony discussed above, 
dealing v.·ith the observations of the defendant by the 1 
witnesses before, during, and after the time in which 
the actual robbery was committed, conclusively demon· , 
strates that the trial identification was based upon ob· 
servations made at the time of the robbery. Plaintif! 
urges that such on-the-scene observation constituted a 
source of reference independent from the identification 
conducted at the preliminary hearing. 
B 
On-the-~cene obserYation was not the only inde· 
pendent source of identification sufficient to purge the 
preliminary hearing identification of any possible taint. 
A photographic identification conducted between the 
time of the offense and the time of the preliminary 
hearing was also such an independent source. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has ex-
plicitly recognized the importance and effectiveness of 
identification by photograph. Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 381, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 
13 
( 1968). The Supreme Court has also established an ex-
plicit standard for determining whether a pretrial pho-
tographic identification was conducted in such a fashion 
as to taint a subsequent identification at trial. 
" [ C] onvictions based upon eyewitness 
identification at trial following a pretrial 
identification by photograph will be set aside 
on that ground only if the photographic identi-
fication procedure was so impermissibly sug-
gestive as to give rise to a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 
Simmons, supra at 384. See also. Stovall v. Denno, 338 
U.S. 293, 301-302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 
( 1967); People v. Evans, 39 Cal. 2d 242, 246 P. 2d 
636 ( 1952) . By no stretch of the imagination did the 
pretrial photographic identification fail to meet this 
standard. Not one of the five factors cited by the Court 
in Simmons as contributing to an incorrect identifica-
tion was present in the instant photographic identifica-
tion procedure. First, the witnesses obtained far more 
than only a brief glimpse of the criminal, as recited at 
Point I of plaintiff's brief. Second, the witnesses' on-
the-scene identification was made under good conditions, 
as recited in plaintiff's brief at Point I. Third, the 
police did not display to the witnesses only the picture 
of a single individual, nor did the picture of a single 
individual recur in the series of pictures shown. (P. 25-
26, 52-55, 73-7 4, 89, 96, 102, T. 8, 19). Fourth, no 
photograph in the series was in any way emphasized. 
( P. 25, 52-54, 73, 89, 96, 102; T. 8, 19) . Fifth, in spite 
of defendant's contentions at pages 10-18 of his brief 
• I I 
no improper suggestions were made by the police in 
connection with the presentation of the photographs 
to the witnesses. 
This fifth possible danger is described in Simmons, 
supra at 383, as follows: 
"The chance of misidentification is also 
heightened if the police indicate to the witness 
that they have other evidence that one of the 
persons pictured committed the crime." 
Defendant points to a remark made to the identify-
ing witnesses by Officer Pilkington after the witnessts 
had completed the identification of defendant from 
photographs. Officer Pilkington said, in effect, that 
a similar crime had been committed in California (T. 9). 
Defendant claims that this remark was suggestive and 
likely to confirm a misidentification and was therefore 
tantamount to the fifth danger cited in Simmons. (Brief 
1 
of Defendant, at 12). The Court in Simmons, however, , 
spoke of remarks by which "[t]he chance of misidenti-
fication is ... heightened," not remarks which come 
after the identification has been completed. A chance 
of misidentification exists only prior to identification. I 
In other words, the Supreme Court referred to the i' 
danger brought about by remarks which precede the 
identification. 
15 
In the instant case the remark was made after each 
witness had positively identified the defendant as the 
person who committed the offense (P. 25-26, 52-55, 73-
7 ,1; T. 9) . A remark, however suggestive it may be, 
made after a properly structured and disciplined photo-
graphic identification procedure resulting in unequiv-
ocal positive identification does not constitute a danger 
to accurate identification and does not offend the Sim-
mons standard. 
Finally, the remark made by Officer Pilkington 
was not sufficiently suggestive to have tainted the pho-
tographic identification even had it been made to the 
"itnesses prior to or in the course of that identification. 
Officer Pilkington testified that he merely said that 
a similar crime had been committed in California (T. 9-
10). He did not say that one of the persons pictured 
had committed that crime or had been convicted of that 
crime; nor did he say that any person had even been 
apprehended in connection with that crime. In fact, Of-
ficer Pilkington testified that at the time of the 
photographic identification he himself did not know 
whether a suspect had been apprehended in connection 
with the California crime ( T. 9-10). In short, no in-
dication was given to the witnesses that the police had 
other evidence that one of the persons pictured commit-
ted the instant offense. 
Plaintiff therefore maintains that the in-court 
identification at trial wai not predicated in any degree 
16 
upon the preliminary hearing identification, but was 
instead predicated upon extensive observation of the 
defendant under near-optimum conditions at the time of 
the robbery, which observations constituted a fully suf. 
ficient independant source of identification. Plaintiff 
also maintains that the pretrial photographic identifica· 
tion was properly conducted in deference to defendant's 
constitutional rights and constituted a separate and a<l· 
ditional independent source of identification. Plaintiff 
further urges that these independent sources together 
serve to purge the in-court identification at trial of any 
taint which might possibly be attributed to the prelim· 
inary hearing identification; and, that each independent 
source alone so serves to purge the trial identification 
of any such taint. 
POINT III 
NO FATAL VARIANCE EXISTS BE· 
TWEEN THE COMPLAINT AND THE IN· 
FOR~1ATION AND THE DISTRICT COURT 
PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISMISS THE 
INFORMATION. 
At Point II in his brief defendant alleges, with· 
out reference to any pertinent statutory or judicial 
) 
17 
authority, a substantial variance in the offense charged 
in the information with respect to the offense charged 
in the complaint. Defendant further alleges that the 
variance violates his constitutional rights, although he 
does not specify which rights. 
After reciting the name of the county in which 
the offense occurred and the name of the offense, the 
complaint charged the offense of robbery as follows: 
"[T]he said Thomas Chester Perry, at 
the time and place aforesaid, did then and 
there unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously and 
with force of arms, take from the presence of 
David Harness, and from the safe of Allen's 
Super Save .Market ... the sum of approxi-
mately $5000.00 in cash and $5000.00 in 
stamped checks .... " (R. 4). 
The information charged the offense of robbery 
as follows: 
" [ T] he said Thomas Chester Perry did, 
with force of arms, take personal property 
from the possession of David Harness, against 
his will. ( R. 13) . 
No claim is made that the complaint and informa-
tion did not fully apprise the defendant of the precise 
charge against him by detailing the facts constituting 
18 
the offense, which is the primary purpose of such in· 
struments. State zi. Colston, 16 Utah 2d 89, 396 P. 2d 
405 ( 1964). The only claim asserted is that the def end-
ant was bound over for trial on a charge different from 
that upon which he was tried, because the name of the 
party from whose possession or presence the property 
was taken was not stated in identical terms in both the 1 
complaint and the information. HoweYer, that the com-
plaint charged defendant with taking property "from 
the presence of David Harness," and from the safe 
of .Allen's Super Save l\larket," while the information 
charged defendant with taking property "from the pos-
session of David Harness" cannot by any means 
be conceived as a variance denying defendant 
his constitutional rights. It is not r e a s o n ab I y 
possible to conceive that one charges an offense in any 
material way different from the other. The mere omis· 
sion in the information of the words "and from the safe 
of Allen's Super Save Market," which were contained 
in the complaint, certainly cannot be deemed a fatal 
variance. Those words in the complaint were not neces- 1 
sary to charging defendant with the felonious taking 
of property from the immediate presence of Mr. Har· 
ness against his will. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-51-1 
( 1953) (Defining robbery as the " ... the felonious 
taking of personal property in the possession of an· 
other from his person or immediate presence, against 
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear."); 
19 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-1 ( 1953) (Requiring that the 
complaint state the " ... person against whom or against 
whose property the offense was committed, if known"); 
and Utah Code Ann.§ 77-21-8 (1953) (Requiring that 
the information state a definition of the offense which is 
" ... sufficient to give the court and the defendant 
notice of what offense is intended to be charged.") 
See also State v. Landrnm, 3 Utah 2d 372, 284 P. 2cl 
693, 695 ( 1955) (Short-form information stating that 
defendants "robbed Joseph Shephard" held sufficient). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully urges that the preliminary 
hearing identification of defendant was not conducted 
in a suggestive fashion and that such identification did 
not taint the later identification at trial. Plaintiff fur-
ther urges that even given the illegality of the prelim-
inary hearing identification and a tainting of the trial 
identification, the latter has as independent sources both 
the on-the-scene observations of the identifying witnesses 
and a lawfully conducted photographic identification, 
either of which was sufficient to purge the trial identi-
fication of any such taint. 
Plaintiff urges that the offense charged in the in-
formation was the same offense charged in the com-
plaint and that defendant was at all times apprised of 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 
20 
Plaintiff therefore prays this Honorable Court to 
affirm the conviction of clef enclant for the crime of 
robbery. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Chief Assistant Attorney 
General 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
